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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
s·TATE OF UTAH 
GERALD KAY MERKLEY, a taxpayer, 
for himself and all others similarly 
situated, Plaintiff and Appellant} 
vs. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body politic 
and corporate, and SALT LAKE CITY, 
a municipal corporation of the State of 
Utah f d d 
' De en ants an Respondents. 
Case No. 
9393 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants agree with the statement of facts set forth 
by plaintiff and further state that this is an action brought by 
plaintiff to test the validity of Chapter 114, Laws of Utah, 
1959. Plaintiff urges the invalidity and unconstitutionality of 
the act. Defendants claim that the act is in all respects valid 
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and constitutional. For the conventence of the court a brief 
resume of the act is set forth herewith: 
Section 1 of the said act sets out its title as ((the uniform 
local sales and use tax law of Utah.'' 
Section 2 of the act is a declaration of the legislative 
purpose that the revenues derived from taxation under the 
act be used to finance capital outlay requirements and service 
bonded indebtedness of local taxing units. 
Section 3 provides that counties, cities, and towns may 
levy sales and use taxes in accordance with the terms of the 
act and prohibits cities and towns from levying such tax unless 
the county has first levied such tax. 
The first section numbered 4 provides that the tax shall 
be Yz% upon retail sales within the counties, cities and towns; 
provides that the levy shall conform to the state sales tax 
act; provides that the local taxing unit shall contract with the 
state tax commission to perform the services incident to the 
administration and operation of the ,sales or use tax; and 
further provides for an exemption from the Yz% sales and 
use tax if a like amount has already been paid to another 
local taxing unit within the state. 
The second section numbered 4 provides that the local 
taxing unit must maintain its ordinances in accordance with 
the provisions of the state sales and use tax law and must 
change the local law as the state law is changed. 
Section 5 provides for a county use tax similar to first 
section numbered 4 relating to sales taxes. 
Section 6 provides for collection by the state tax com-
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mission and further provides that the state tax commission may 
charge a fee not to exceed 2V2% of the amount collected. 
Section 7 pruvides that the tax commission may determine 
the situs of the consummation of retail sales where the 
retailer has not a single definite fixed place of ·business and 
further provides that it may establish a formula whereby the 
revenues collected by public utilities may be apportioned to 
the local taxing units. 
Section 8 provides for a presumption that intrastate retail 
sales are consummated at the place of business of the retailer. 
Section 9 provides that the act is inseparable and the 
invalidity of one provision voids all. 
Section 10 provides for an effective date of the local tax 
levy. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES NOT 
VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
POINT II. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, CONFORMS 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT III. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES NOT 
UNLAWFULLY DELEGATE LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY, 
NOR DOES IT UNLAWFULLY INTERFERE WITH THE 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF COUNTIES OR MU-
NICIPALITIES. 
POINT IV. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS NOT VOID 
FOR LACK OF UNIFORMITY. 
POINT V. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS SUFFI-
CIENTLY DEFINITE AND REASONABLE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I, II, III 
I. CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES NOT 
VIOLATE ARTICLE VI, SECTION 29 OF THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION. 
II. CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, CONFORMS 
TO ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTI-
TUTION. 
III. CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, DOES 
NOT UNLAWFULLY D E L E G AT E LEGISLATIVE 
.·l 
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AUTHORITY, NOR DOES IT UNLAWFULLY INTER-
FERE WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF 
COUNTIES OR MUNICIPALITIES. 
Defendants for simplicity will combine their first three 
points for argument inasmuch as all three relate to the questions 
of unlawful delegation of power and unlawful interference 
with local self -government. 
Article VI, Section 29 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
((The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any muni-
cipal improvement, money, property or effects, ... 
to levy taxes, . . . or to perform any municipal func-
tions." 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
((The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the pur-
pose of any county, city, town or other municipal cor-
poration, but may, by law, vest in the corporate authori-
ties, thereof, respectively, the power to assess and 
collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation.'' 
The obvious purpose of these two articles of the Utah 
Constitution is to provide for the municipalities and counties 
of this state the right to local self-government. Local self-
government has historically been one of the bulwarks of 
American liberty and it was the intention of the constitution 
makers that the right to it be preserved and maintained invio-
late. As was stated in Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 
285 Pac. 1001: 
((There can be no doubt but that the framers of our 
state Constitution recognized the rights of the people 
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of Utah to local self-government. It was to preserve 
local self-government free from needless legislative 
interference that the power to levy taxes for local 
purposes was by the state Constitution vested exclu-
sively in the proper authorities of counties, cities, towns, 
and other municipal corporations. The power to collect 
and control the revenues of a municipality is of the 
very essence of local self-government. The same reasons 
that may be urged against legislative interference with 
a levy of a general property tax for municipal purposes 
apply to the imposing of a license tax by the Legislature 
for purely municipal purposes. The levy of either tax 
by the Legislature interferes with local self-govern-
ment. Upon principle and the great weight of authority, 
section 5 of article 13 of our state Constitution pre-
cludes the Legislature from imposing a license tax 
upon the inhabitants of a city, town or county for the 
sole purpose of raising revenue for such city, town, or 
county." 
This Honorable Court has always been zealous in pre-
serving the right of municipalities and counties to local self-
government. See Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 
72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, and State Water Pollution Control 
Board v. Salt Lake City, 6 Utah 2d 247, 311 P.2d 370. How-
ever, Chapter 114, Laws of Utah, 1959, does not interfere with 
local self-government. Counties and municipalities are given 
discretion as to whether or not they wish to adopt the tax. 
The tax is not imposed by the legislature for the benefit of 
local taxing units, but is imposed by the various counties and 
municipalities by their various duly elected and appointed 
representatives; viz, their boards of city commissioners and 
boards of county commissioners. The local citizenry, through 
their duly elected representatives, have the power to deter-
(. 
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mine whether or not the tax will be imposed. The legislature 
has simply prescribed certain conditions which must take effect 
if the tax in question is levied. The most important of these 
is that the local authority must contract with the State Tax 
Commission to collect the tax. This is not a burdensome require-
n1ent for cities, nor is it burdensome upon the taxpaying 
citizen, foi the 'Tax Commission is already collecting on behalf 
of the state a state-wide sales tax for state-wide purposes. 
It \vill be readily seen that the only practical and in-
expensive way to assess and collect a local sales tax is for the 
State Tax Commission to collect it at the same time it collects 
the state tax and then remit to the local taxing units. His-
torically, local taxing units have always found it necessary 
to employ collectors of taxes for the taxes that they have levied. 
Generally these are individuals, but quite often, may be other 
entities. McQuillin, in his work, Municipal Corporations, states: 
Section 44.131: ((Power to levy and collect taxes, it 
is commonly held, carries with it the implied power to 
employ the necessary and usual procedure to execute 
the power and collect the revenue contemplated by the 
grant of power to make the levy.'' 
Section 44.132: ((In many cities, taxes are collected 
upon behalf of municipalities by county officers, who 
become agents of the city for the purpose." 
Section 44.13 3: ((Except where such duty is imposed 
upon and restricted to particular municipal officers, a 
municipal corporation, unless forbidden by statute or 
charter, may make a contract with any person to collect 
its taxes, and authority to contract for collection of 
delinquent taxes may be authorized by legislative act. 
Thus a municipal corporation having full power in the 
premises may employ banks as collection agencies and 
agree with them concerning remittances." 
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In support of this last statement, lvicQuillin cites Best 
Foods v. Christensen, supra. 
Insofar as unlawful delegation of power to the State 
Tax Commission is concerned, it will at once be noted that the 
act in question does not give power to the State Tax Com-
mission to determine whether or not the tax will be imposed, 
but merely gives it the power to determine facts. The tax is 
imposed by the municipalities and the counties, and the State 
Tax Commission is simply given the duty and the right to 
determine whether or not the tax is to be paid by a particular 
individual and where it is to be paid in order to determine 
to whom 1t will be remitted. In other words, rather than dele-
gating legislative power, the act simply delegates to the Tax 
Commission the power to determine the facts upon which the 
act will operate. Under modern-day standards of delegation, 
this type of delegation is not unlawful. In Revne v. Trade 
Commission, 113 Utah 155, 192 P.2d 563, this court said: 
c CW e recognize, of course, that the legislature may 
properly delegate to some administrative body the 
duty of ascertaining the facts upon which the provi-
sions of a law are to function, ... The question of 
an improper delegation of legislative authority lies 
imbedded in the extent of the power granted to the 
administrative body." 
If the counties and municipalities think too much power 
has been delegated to the tax commission, they have the option 
not to levy the tax in question. There is no law compelling 
them to impose the tax and delegate the power to collect the 
same to the State Tax Commission unless they wish to do so. 
However, in view of the fact that in this action the city and 
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the county are not complaining of an unlawful delegation 
but are rather seeking to uphold the sales tax act, the Court 
should not be overly concerned with this question of the 
authority of the Tax Commission to interfere with the muni-
cipal monies, property or improvements. See Bailey v. VanDyke, 
66 Utah 184, 240 Pac. 454. In that case, under authority of 
state statute, defendant Weber County made an agreement 
with the U.S.A.C. and the director of the U. S. Extension 
Service to cooperate with these agencies and to assist in certain 
basic research. Defendant County agreed to assume some cost. 
Plaintiff contended that the legislation authorizing this type 
of agreement was unconstitutional and void, because the legis-
lature had imposed taxes for county purposes. The court 
rejected this contention, saying: 
((This claim is wholly insupportable because the 
statute in question does not impose any obligation 
whatever upon the county. The county is merely given 
legal power to enter into the contract and provide the 
funds or not, as its duly constituted officers may elect. 
There is no imposition of taxes, direct or indirect, by 
legislative authority upon the county, and no inter-
ference with local self-government by the county." 
The act in question is similar to the legislation in the 
Bailey v. VanDyke case in that it gives the local taxing unit 
the power to determine whether or not it will levy the tax 
and there can be no possible interference with local self-
government unless the tax is levied and even then there is 
no unlavv·ful interference with county or municipal government. 
Plaintiff also contends that t he act delegates certain 
municipal powers to the county in that it authorizes cities to 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
enact the tax only after counties have done so. Plaintiff states 
that after enactment by the county, cities are forced to enact 
the legislation or their citizens will suffer taxation without 
benefit. This is not correct, for the citizens of cities \vithin a 
county are also citizens of the county and it must be assumed 
that county levies are spent for the benefit of all citizens of 
the county. Therefore there is not taxation without benefit. 
The act does not delegate the power to the county to determine 
whether or not the city will levy the tax, but simply prohibits 
the levy by the city in the first instance unless a county-wide 
tax has been imposed. There are good economic reasons 
justifying the insertion of these provisions into the act by the 
legislature and this is purely a matter for legislative discretion 
with which the court will not interfere. 
POINT IV. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS NOT VOID 
FOR LACK OF UNIFORMITY. 
Plaintiff devotes a good portion of his brief to argumg 
that the act in question allows some municipalities and counties 
to levy a tax and allows other municipalities and counties 
not to levy a tax. This is true, but does not render the law 
invalid, for nowhere in the statutes or constitution is there 
any requirement that all counties, municipalities or local taxing 
units must have the same tax rates. The only constitutional 
requirement is that the operation of a statute must be uniforn1 
throughout the state. Certainly, the operation of this statute 
is uniform throughout the state. All counties have the option 
10 
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provided for in the statute and once the county has enacted 
an ordinance in accordance therewith, all municipalities within 
the county have likewise the same option. If a uniform tax 
levy were required throughout the state, the tax levy of every 
local taxing unit would be faulty, for it is common knowledge 
that each taxing unit within the state imposes taxes at a 
different rate and that even within Salt Lake County there 
are numerous separate and distinct taxing units which allow 
the imposition of one tax upon a resident of the county and 
a different tax upon other residents of the county located in 
a different taxing unit. 
Uniformity of taxation means uniformity within a local 
taxing district as was stated by the court in the Town of Palm 
Beach v. City of West Palm Beach, Florida, 55 So. 2d 566: 
"It is quite true that Section 1 of Article IX of the 
Constitution requires the Legislature to provide for ta 
uniform and equal rate of taxation.' This provision 
of the Constitution has been construed many times to 
mean that the rate of taxation for state purposes shall 
be uniform throughout the state, for county purposes 
uniform throughout the county, for municipal purposes 
throughout the municipality and for district purposes 
throughout the district. 
"It was clearly the legislative intent and mandate 
that the taxes to be levied should be levied by the 
respective municipalities and that the rate of taxation 
in each municipality should be uniform.'' 
It is equally clear that in this case it was the clear intent 
of the legislature that the rate of tax throughout each respective 
municipality should be uniform. 
11 
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The Legislature in this instance has required more uni-
formity than is generally required of taxing acts, since it 
required uniformity of the sales tax within a county. This is 
accomplished through the provisions which provide that a 
city may not levy the tax until the county has first levied it 
and then that the citizen may have a credit against his county 
tax if he owes a tax to a municipality. It is difficult to com-
prehend how the legislature could have enacted a more uniform 
tax act which would have given local governments needed 
tax revenues, since the legislature could not, in view of Article 
XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution, impose a state-wide 
tax for local purposes. 
Plaintiff's argument that the tax statute gives a free rein 
to the municipalities to impose any sort of tax that they wish 
without limit is certainly a strained and unreasonable inter-
pretation of the act. The statute in its title provides that the 
taxes shall be integrated ((In order to establish uniformity of 
taxation within a county,'' and Section 3 of the act provides 
that the county's, city's and town's levy of a sales tax must 
be in accordance with the provisions of the act. It is clear 
beyond any doubt that statutes attacked upon constitutional 
grounds must be construed if possible so that they will be 
constitutional and not unconstitutional. As was succinctly 
pointed out in the case of Leatham v. Reger, 54 Utah 491, 
182 Pac. 187: 
nit is elementary doctrine universally applied in this 
country that, if an act is open to two interpretations 
or constructions, one of which creates a conflict with 
some constitutional provisions, while the other makes 
the act harmonious with the Constitution, it is the 
12 
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duty of the courts to adopt the latter interpretation 
and construction.'· 
Another rule of construction that has universal application 
to taxing statutes is that the constitution is a limitation only 
upon the taxing power of the legislature and is not a grant of 
such power thereto. In Garrett Freight Lines v. Tax Comm., 
103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523, the court quotes from Kimball t'. 
Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1, in part as follows: 
~ ~ ~The taxing power of the state is lodged abso-
lutely in the legislature, and, as the responsibility of 
enacting laws devolves exclusively upon that branch 
of the government, whether the right of taxation has 
been exercised justly or unjustly, wisely or unwisely, it 
is not for the judiciary to inquire ... 
'' 'The people of a state therefore give to their 
government a right of taxing themselves and their 
property, and, as the exigencies of government cannot 
be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of 
this right, resting confident! y on the interest of the 
legislator, and in the influence of the constituents over 
their representative, to guard them against its abuse.'' 
Consequently, if the proper rules of statutory and con-
stitutional construction and limitations are followed, the claims 
of plaintiff that the statute lacks state-wide uniformity and 
that cities and towns have been given a license to enact sales 
taxes without regard to the one-half per cent limit should be 
disregarded by this honorable court, since these claims are 
based upon strained and unreasonable constructions of the 
statute and the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiff's contention that the act allows double taxation 
ts also a strained and unreasonable construction of the act. 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Since all taxes are remitted through the state tax commission, 
the credit must likewise be given by them. Consequently, the 
tax commission is allowed to offset for the individual taxpayer 
who is making remittance to the tax commission the amount 
of his city tax against what would otherwise be charged him 
under the levy of his county tax. Both taxes are indeed ''due'' 
and payable at the same time upon the remittance to the state 
tax commission and consequently, the taxpayer is allowed a 
credit against his county tax for the payment of taxes Cldue" 
the city. 
POINT V. 
CHAPTER 114, LAWS OF UTAH, 1959, IS SUFFI-
CIENTLY DEFINITE AND REASONABLE. 
The act is entirely clear, certain and reasonable in its 
operation and application. Counties, cities and towns of the 
state have been receiving revenue therefrom from collections 
by the state tax commission without a scintilla of reportable 
dispute, discussions or differences. The act has functioned 
well for the time it has been in operation and neither the county, 
city, or tax commission are having difficulty with the inter-
pretation or enforcement of the act. 
CONCLUSION 
From all that appears herein, it is clear from a reasonable 
construction of the statute in question and the Utah Con-
14 
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stitutional provisions that the statute is in all respects a valid 
and constitutional exercise of the legislative power of the 
state, and is in all respects a valid and enforceable enactment. 
The trial court's decision should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES L. BARKER, JR. GROVER A. GILES 
City Attorney County Attorney 
NORMAN W. KETTNER LOUIS M. HAYNIE 
Assistant City Attorney Deputy County Attorney 
DAVID E. WEST 
Assistant Attorney General 
for State Tax Commission 
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